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I A Americans have never been of one mind about gambling, and attitudes have swung back and forth. By the end of the 19th century, gambling was largely banned throughout the country, 1 but beginning in the s and s, laws prohibiting gambling were gradually loosened.

In , New Jersey adopted a constitutional amendment that barred all gambling in the State. Some were located within driving distance of Atlantic City, 13 and nearby States and many others legalized casino gambling. Opponents argue that it is particularly addictive and especially attractive to young people with a strong interest in sports, 16 and in the past gamblers corrupted and seriously damaged the reputation of professional and amateur sports. In Nevada, sports gambling was legal in casinos, 25 and three States hosted sports lotteries or allowed sports pools.

New Jersey voters approved an amendment to the State Constitution making it lawful for the legislature to authorize sports gambling, Art. Laws p. The Act quickly came under attack. See National Collegiate Athletic Assn. Christie, F. In making this argument, the State relied primarily on two cases, New York v. United States, U. In New York, we held that a federal law unconstitutionally ordered the State to regulate in accordance with federal standards, and in Printz, we found that another federal statute unconstitutionally compelled state officers to enforce federal law.

The plaintiffs countered that PASPA is critically different from the commandeering cases because it does not command the States to take any affirmative act. Without an affirmative fed- eral command to do something, the plaintiffs insisted, there can be no claim of commandeering. The District Court found no anticommandeering violation, id. The right to do that which is not prohibited derives not from the authority of the state but from the inherent rights of the people.

New Jersey filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, raising the anticommandeering issue. To the contrary, New Jersey is free to repeal those prohibitions in whole or in part. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. See also Brief for Respondents in Opposition in No. We denied review.

Christie v. Picking up on the suggestion that a partial repeal would be allowed, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the law now before us. The Act declares that it is not to be interpreted as causing the State to authorize, license, sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote sports gambling. Instead, it is framed as a repealer.

The new law also specified that the repeal was effective only as to wagers on sporting events not involving a New Jersey college team or a collegiate event taking place in the State. Predictably, the same plaintiffs promptly commenced a new action in federal court. Christie, 61 F. Governor of N. But the court declined to say whether a repeal that was more complete than the Act would still amount to an authorization.

We granted review to decide the important constitutional question presented by these cases, sub nom. The parties advance dueling interpretations, and this dispute has an important bearing on the constitutional issue that we must decide. Indeed, the United States expressly concedes that the provision is unconstitutional if it means what petitioners claim. Brief for United States 8, A Petitioners argue that the anti-authorization provision requires States to maintain their existing laws against sports gambling without alteration.

They therefore contend that any state law that has the effect of permitting sports gambling, including a law totally or partially repealing a prior prohibition, amounts to an authorization. Brief for Petitioners in No. Respondents interpret the provision more narrowly.

Brief for Respondents And this, they say, is precisely what the Act does: It empowers a defined group of entities, and it endows them with the authority to conduct sports gambling operations. Respondents do not take the position that PASPA bans all modifications of old laws against sports gambling, Brief for Respondents 20, but just how far they think a modification could go is not clear.

But if the state modified its law, whether through a new authorization or through an amendment partially repealing the existing prohibition, to authorize the state to conduct a sports lottery, that modified law would be preempted.

The United States makes a similar argument. At that time, all forms of sports gambling were illegal in the great majority of States, and in that context, the competing definitions offered by the parties lead to the same conclusion. A State is not regarded as authorizing everything that it does not prohibit or regulate. No one would use the term in that way.

We commonly speak of state authoriza- tion only if the activity in question would otherwise be restricted. But one might well say exactly that if the person previously was prohibited from engaging in the activity. But what if a State enacted a law enabling, but not requiring, one or more of its subdivisions to decide whether to authorize sports gambling? Such a state law would not itself authorize sports gambling. The ban on legalization at the local level addresses this problem. The interpretation adopted by the Third Circuit and advocated by respondents and the United States not only ignores the situation that Congress faced when it enacted PASPA but also leads to results that Congress is most unlikely to have wanted.

This is illustrated by the implausible conclusions that all of those favoring alternative interpretations have been forced to reach about the extent to which the provision permits the repeal of laws banning sports gambling. The Third Circuit could not say which, if any, partial repeals are allowed.

Respondents and the United States tell us that the PASPA ban on state authorization allows complete repeals, but beyond that they identify no clear line. It is improbable that Congress meant to enact such a nebulous regime. C The respondents and United States argue that even if there is some doubt about the correctness of their interpretation of the anti-authorization provision, that interpretation should be adopted in order to avoid any anticommandeering problem that would arise if the provision were construed to require States to maintain their laws prohibiting sports gambling.

Brief for Respondents 38; Brief for United States They invoke the canon of interpretation that a statute should not be held to be unconstitutional if there is any reasonable interpretation that can save it. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, U. The plausibility of the alternative interpretations is debatable, but even if the law could be interpreted as respondents and the United States suggest, it would still violate the anticommandeering principle, as we now explain.

III A The anticommandeering doctrine may sound arcane, but it is simply the expression of a fundamental structural decision incorporated into the Constitution, i. Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. Rossiter ed. Ashcroft, U. The Constitution limits state sovereignty in several ways. It directly prohibits the States from exercising some attributes of sovereignty.

See, e. Some grants of power to the Federal Government have been held to impose implicit restrictions on the States. Davis, U. Garamendi, U. And the Constitution indirectly restricts the States by granting certain legislative powers to Congress, see Art. VI, cl. This means that when federal and state law conflict, federal law prevails and state law is preempted. The legislative powers granted to Congress are sizable, but they are not unlimited.

The Constitution confers on Congress not plenary legislative power but only certain enumerated powers. Therefore, all other legislative power is reserved for the States, as the Tenth Amendment confirms. And conspicuously absent from the list of powers given to Congress is the power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States. The anticommandeering doctrine simply represents the recognition of this limit on congressional authority. Although the anticommandeering principle is simple and basic, it did not emerge in our cases until relatively recently, when Congress attempted in a few isolated instances to extend its authority in unprecedented ways.

The pioneering case was New York v. In enacting this provision, Congress issued orders to either the legislative or executive branch of state government depending on the branch authorized by state law to take the actions demanded. In this respect, the Constitution represented a sharp break from the Articles of Confederation.

Oregon, 7 Wall. Five years after New York, the Court applied the same principles to a federal statute requiring state and local law enforcement officers to perform background checks and related tasks in connection with applications for handgun licenses. Printz, U. This rule applies, Printz held, not only to state officers with policymaking responsibility but also to those assigned more mundane tasks.

B Our opinions in New York and Printz explained why adherence to the anticommandeering principle is important. Without attempting a complete survey, we mention several reasons that are significant here. Second, the anticommandeering rule promotes political accountability. When Congress itself regulates, the responsibility for the benefits and burdens of the regulation is apparent.

Voters who like or dislike the effects of the regulation know who to credit or blame. By contrast, if a State imposes regulations only because it has been commanded to do so by Congress, responsibility is blurred.

See New York, supra, at —; Printz, supra, at — Third, the anticommandeering principle prevents Congress from shifting the costs of regulation to the States. If Congress enacts a law and requires enforcement by the Executive Branch, it must appropriate the funds needed to administer the program. It is pressured to weigh the expected benefits of the program against its costs. But if Congress can compel the States to enact and enforce its program, Congress need not engage in any such analysis.

That provision unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do. And this is true under either our interpretation or that advocated by respondents and the United States. In either event, state legislatures are put under the direct control of Congress. It is as if federal officers were installed in state legislative chambers and were armed with the authority to stop legislators from voting on any offending proposals.

A more direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy to imagine. Neither respondents nor the United States contends that Congress can compel a State to enact legislation, but they say that prohibiting a State from enacting new laws is another matter. This distinction is empty. The basic principle—that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies in either event.

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